Taking action on dirty money

Kleptopia, a new book by Tom Burgis was reviewed in the Financial Times of 14 November. The review provides a good summary of the book which uses real stories to show how autocrats have used the financial system to effectively steal money from their clients and move it to accounts primarily in Europe and North America. Whilst covering a variety of stories, as noted by the Financial Times they are ultimately “a similar tale of political and moral corruption, violence, weak regulation and complicity within the international financial system where money is quickly anonymised.”

And then reported the Financial Times on 17 December that Credit Suisse is being charged with money laundering for Bulgarian clients. Although this money laundering was related to crime including cocaine trafficking, it notes again how individuals within large banks work around policies to prevent money laundering. Both Credit Suisse and the individual are claiming innocence so it may well be that nothing wrong was done but only time will tell.

With both of these stories, it was therefore heartening to read about the official launch of an initiative in The Netherlands. Five of the largest Dutch banks have set up Transactie Monitoring Nederland. Under the interim leadership of Jeroen Rijpkema (a former colleague of mine with experience in private banking), TMN is a “collective initiative (to) enable the banks to improve their detection of these complex criminal money flows and networks and thereby help to improve the protection of the financial system.” As noted by TMN, only through seeing a full spectrum of transactions is it possible to identify those that are related to money laundering and criminal activity. Perhaps other large international banks should be considering a similar approach to address the issues raised in Kleptopia.

Taking responsibility

Just a week ago I wrote about the inability of Gary Cohn from Goldman to take responsibility for paying back his bonuses to Goldman as a result of losses Goldman incurred related to the IMDB funding scandal in Malaysia. His inability to accept responsibility is unfortunately consistent with the actions of far too many senior bankers for whom the misdeeds of their banks are never the responsibility of senior managers. This problem can be seen in banks besides Goldman.

Wells Fargo is a bank that has had a long history of issues in its dealing with clients. I provided some background on Wells Fargo in a post in March of this year. But the challenges there are laid out in great detail in a recent Slate article that is a version of a podcast Slate has produced. As noted many low level employees lost their jobs over their actions but one could question whether the senior managers responsible for the culture and policies that led to the mistreatment of clients paid an appropriate price for what happened.

Now it is the turn of Ralph Hamers, the former CEO of ING in the Netherlands, to be held to account. ING has had substantial issues related to money laundering. As a result the bank has paid substantial fines (nearly €800 million) in 2018. As part of that settlement, it was agreed that the board and management would not be subject to criminal charges. But as outlined in a Financial Times opinion column of John Plender as well as in other news stories, this immunity from prosecution has been challenged in the Dutch court system and may not be valid. As noted in the column: “The Hague court of appeal said it believed grounds were, in fact, sufficient for a successful prosecution of Mr Hamers ‘as the de facto supervisor of the criminal offences committed by ING.’ It added: ‘The facts are serious, no settlement has been reached with the director himself, nor has he taken public responsibility for his actions.'”

This column goes on to note that for far too many issues of banking malpractice, junior employees take the brunt of the pain whilst managers at the top are rarely held accountable in a meaningful way. Plender goes on to note that after the S&L crisis in the US in the ’80’s, there were many senior managers held accountable and some even went to jail. However, those held accountable were from smaller institutions and not from the largest banks in the world. It is possible that this lack of accountability for the senior managers of the largest banks in the world is one reason why the politics of today have a particular anti-elite tone. It would seem that if you can go to the World Economic Forum in Davos, you have a get out of jail card for any other responsibilities you have. The elite truly live by other rules than the rest of us.

The wisdom of regulators

The Bank of England under Mark Carney has been a leader in regulatory action regarding climate change. In June 2019 they published a report, The Future of Finance, by Huw Steenis. In addition the Bank of England provided a response to this report. Both highlight the importance for banks to take climate change seriously in their decision processes.

My good friend and colleague, Paul Malyon, has alerted me to the opportunity to hear directly from Mark Carney through his Reith Lectures. As noted on the BBC site that provides these lectures to be followed on line: “(T)he BBC each year invites a leading figure to deliver a series of lectures on radio. The aim is to advance public understanding and debate about significant issues of contemporary interest.”

The Carney lectures began on 2 December with the final episode airing on 23 December. They could be great listening over the holiday season as we all celebrate quietly due to COVID-19 restrictions.

Corporations and social responsibility

Martin Wolf in the Financial Times alerted me to a very interesting and important e-book made available through ProMarket, a publication of the Stigler Center at Booth Business School (disclosure – I received an MBA from Booth in 1977). This book compiles 28 essays, including one from Martin Wolf, that comment on Milton Friedman’s essay of 50 years ago in the New York Times that stated: “a corporation’s only social responsibility was to increase its profits.” The book contains a variety of views and makes for very interesting reading, especially for those of us who believe corporations should look beyond pure profitability in their actions.

I found the most interesting essay to be that of Luis Zingales who is currently at Booth. He was the one of the editors of the book and his essay is the final one included. His essay was a nuanced and important criticism and refinement of the original Friedman views. Key quotes from that essay include the following:

“Five decades later, it is important to . . .  restate Friedman as a theorem. Under what conditions is it socially efficient for managers to focus only on maximizing shareholder value? First, companies should operate in a competitive environment, which I will define as firms being both price and rules takers. Second, there should not be externalities (or the government should be able to address perfectly these externalities through regulation and taxation). Third, contracts are complete, in the sense that we can specify in a contract all relevant contingencies at no cost.”

“If these conditions are satisfied, Friedman’s result, which I will label the Friedman Separation Theorem, holds.”

He goes on to address each of the three conditions he lists noting issues in reality with each of them.

  1. “The really problematic assumption is assumption number one. Friedman himself recognizes that a mo- nopolist maximizing shareholder value is not good for society.”
  2. “When it comes to the second assumption, nobody in their right mind will defend the idea that we live in a world without externalities.” And he goes on to note: “corporations are born with an original sin: the ability to externalize some of their costs.”

  3. “Are contracts complete? The answer is a resounding ‘no.'”

This summary provides good insight into the critical views of Zingales but the final words of his essay provide very useful and nuanced perspective

“In sum, Friedman was more right than his detractors claim and more wrong than his supporters would like us to believe. His “theorem” has greatly contributed to determining when maximizing shareholder value is good for society and when it is not. The discipline imposed by Friedman’s theorem also forces greater accountability on managers. In the world of 2020, the biggest shareholder in most corporations is all of us, who have their pension money invested in stocks. We are the real silent majority. Corporate managers finance political candidates, lobby for self-serving legislation, and capture regulation. They have the power to use our money to fight against our own interest. While Friedman did not anticipate these degenerations, he warned us against the risk of unaccountable managers. This warning will remain his most enduring contribution.”

I highly recommend downloading and reading the complete book.

 

Doing the wrong thing

I have previously written about the IMDB scandal in Malaysia involving Goldman Sachs. But that story just continues to show how bankers do not take responsibility as reported this week in the Financial Times. At the time that Goldman reached several settlements, it announced that it would also claw back bonuses paid to individuals either directly involved in the IMDB transaction or in senior positions of responsibility at Goldman when the transaction occurred. As noted in the Financial Times, Gary Cohn “is holding out on the bank’s request for him to return millions of dollars of his pay.”

I suspect his decision is not due to lack of the ability to repay. In the Goldman Proxy Statement of 2015 (he resigned to work for the Trump administration in 2016), it was noted that from 2013 to 2015 Mr. Cohn earned just under $60 million. A rather tidy sum. To put it in perspective, Mr. Cohn’s earnings over those years were equal to the average income of about 30,000 households in Malaysia. Those are the households whose taxes will be used to pay in part for the missing billions.

So as noted in the Lex column in the Financial Times on 3 December, “Sometimes a polite request is not enough.” What will it take for Mr. Cohn not to continue to do the wrong thing? I suspect 30,000 Malaysian households would want to know.

Do the right thing

The business case for ESG investing is a strong one based upon financial returns as shown in research by George Serafeim from Harvard Business School. I worked on a research project regarding banks using his approach with the Global Alliance for Banking on Values along with Deloitte and the European Investment Bank. This research showed a better ESG focus delivered better financial returns (see report here).

However, it is possible that a focus on financial returns dilutes the real mission and goal of impact investing, delivering positive impact on society. Whilst it is a “nice to have” if financial returns are better, those returns should not overshadow the core reason for values-based investing which is improving society relative to economic prosperity, social empowerment and environmental regeneration.

This dilemma and challenge was very helpfully discussed in an opinion piece in the Financial Times. Jonathan Ford, the author, correctly notes: “‘(i)mpact’ investment only has real meaning if it means funding activities that would not otherwise happen.” He provides several examples of “greenwashing” in his comments. But most importantly he reminds us of the basic fact – impact investing should not be primarily about financial returns but about delivering impact. As he notes: “. . . why does everyone want decarbonisation, fair wages or the encouragement of diversity on boards? Not because they raise returns but because they are the right thing to do.”

Balancing the mix of impact, return and risk is a challenge but one we should embrace with all its complexity and ambiguity.

Payments – back to the future for some

Payments continues to be an interesting area to follow in the evolution of banking. Unfortunately most banks have forgotten the importance of this bank product leaving the field open to competitors who have been creating substantial value for their stakeholders. But it appears that this traditional neglect by mainstream banks that tended to favour the more “sexy” investment banking activities is starting to shift.

The latest example of this shift is with Deutsche Bank as reported in the Financial Times. Of interest is that Deutsche Bank sold a portion of its payment business to a non-bank entity earlier in 2012. It did so at a time that Deutsche appeared to be earning high returns in investment bank (subsequently seen not to be real returns) and a view that payments were risky (as if investment banking has not been risky for Deutsche).

But of course the question for Deutsche and other banks is: Are they too late to the party?